

the closed *é* from the open *e*, the former being represented by *fatha yā*; if close examination shows that this script is reasonably consistent, some welcome light will be thrown on this obscure phonetic point. Another important phonetic point is that the *Nahc*, like *Rabgūzi*, retains the old Turkish voiced dental spirant *ḡ* in such words as *edḡti* 'good'. To that extent the language is close to the *Khakani* of *Kāšgari* and the *Kutadḡu bilig*. On the other hand the indiscriminate use of vowel letters suggests that the distinction between long and short vowels in old Turkish, which was indicated, though not entirely consistently, in *Kāšgari*, and seems also to emerge, again not entirely consistently, in the scansion of the *Kutadḡu bilig*, had by the fourteenth century ceased to be perceptible. One interesting feature of the *Nahc* is that, although it was written a century after the Mongol invasion, there is at first sight no obvious sign of the mass invasion of the language by Mongolian loanwords which is so conspicuous a feature of the vocabulary of Classical *Çağatay* and of the Paris '*Oğuz nama*' edited by Dr. Arat, and has even left some marks on the Turkish vocabulary of the *Codex Cumanicus*.

It is therefore obvious that Dr. Eckmann's promised word-list will be a work of the first importance for students of the history of the Turkish languages. We have long been waiting impatiently for Dr. Arat's word-list of the *Kutadḡu bilig*; we shall now be waiting equally impatiently for Dr. Eckmann's list. It is greatly to be hoped that the TDK will put the learned world still further in its debt in the near future by publishing these two vital works. It is also perhaps not too much to ask that the words in these two lists should be spelt as they were pronounced then in Central Asia and not as they are pronounced now in Turkey. There is, for example, every reason to suppose that our author called his book *Nahcu'l-farādīs*, not *Nehcü'l-feradis*. It is unfortunate that, so far as is known, no scholar is preparing a word-list of *Rabgūzi*. Until that is available, one link will be missing in the chain of the history of the Turkish languages in the crucial period of the eleventh to fifteenth centuries when great changes were taking place. Nevertheless great progress has been made in recent years in accumulating the necessary material; and when Drs. Arat and Eckmann's lists have appeared, it will be possible to get a clear picture of the Turkish vocabulary as it existed before the Mongol invasion introduced a new complicating factor, and *inter alia* to judge how far the Turks of those days, when they ceased to be nomads and became a civilized people, thought that

they could make their own language go, with its few Sogdian, Chinese, and other old loanwords, and for what concepts they found it more convenient to adopt the vocabulary of the Perso-Arabic world with which they were for the first time coming into intimate contact.

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PAUL THIEME: *Mitra and Aryaman*. (Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, Vol. 41.) pp. 1-96. New Haven, Conn.: Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1957. \$2.

J. DUCHESNE-GUILLEMIN: *The Western response to Zoroaster*. (Ratanbai Katrak Lectures, 1956.) vii, 112 pp. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958. 25s.

These two works are here reviewed together because both are concerned with Professor G. Dumézil's classification of the Indo-Iranian gods, which Professor Thieme uncompromisingly rejects, and Professor Duchesne-Guillemin unreservedly accepts.

In D.'s pattern of functions, reproduced by D.-G. on p. 40, *Varuṇa* and *Mitra* represent the function of sovereignty, *Varuṇa* being the 'despote', the 'magicien', *Mitra* the benevolent protector, 'juriste', and 'presque un prêtre divin', cf. Dumézil, *L'idéologie tripartite des Indo-Européens*, 1958, pp. 38 sq., 62 sqq., 67 [on this latest work of D.'s see Professor J. Brough's article above, p. 69 sqq.]. *Aryaman* is for D. a 'souverain mineur' (op. cit., 68) who belongs to 'the *Mitra* half of sovereignty' (D.-G., p. 41), while *Varuṇa* 'restait solitaire dans ses lointains'.

Of such distinctions, T. points out, the *Rigveda* knows nothing. When D. quotes *Rigvedic* passages in support of his theory he has either misunderstood them or pressed them to suit his views. In any case, to set up a theoretical framework of functions in order to arrive at a definition of *Mitra* is to start at the wrong end. For the god is clearly and sufficiently defined by his name. '*Mitra*' means 'contract', as Meillet established long ago and D. knows but keeps forgetting. T. guards against such forgetfulness by altogether abolishing the name 'Mit(h)ra' in his translation of Vedic and Avestan verses, and replacing it by the name 'Contract'. This simple device enables T. to show that the *Rigvedic* hymn to *Mitra* (iii, 59), which hitherto had been dismissed as colourless and uninformative, offers a fairly detailed description of the god, in terms which closely resemble those of the Avestan hymn to *Mithra*. T.'s penetrating analysis of hymn iii, 59

constitutes the chief merit of this sober and eminently reasonable monograph, and marks a considerable advance in Mithraic studies.

On Aryaman T. recapitulates the arguments he had put forward in *Der Fremdling im Rigveda*: if *aryá* means 'hospitable' the original meaning of *aryamán-* can be assumed to have been 'hospitality'. Here much depends on whether one accepts T.'s explanation of Ved. *arí*, on which his interpretation of *aryá* as 'concerned with strangers, hospitable' is based. To me the explanation seems convincing: the hostile and friendly meanings of *arí* are to be traced to a basic meaning 'stranger', from which on the one hand 'enemy' could develop, on the other hand 'guest' and 'host'. There is, however, one Rigvedic verse, ix, 79, 3, in which T. failed to do justice to the context of *arí*, as D. has not been slow to point out (op. cit., 113): *utá svásyā árātyā arir hí śá | utdnyásyā árātyā vřko hí śáh* must indeed mean '[Protège nous] de la nuisance *propria*: car c'est l'*arí*. [Protège nous] de la nuisance *aliena*: car c'est le loup'. But contrary to D.'s belief this translation does not invalidate T.'s understanding of *arí*, as *vřka* may well refer in the present context to the animal 'wolf', and not 'l'homme qui mérite d'être appelé loup'. The contrast will then be between ferocious animals on the one hand ('nuisance *aliena*'), and enemies belonging to one's own, human, kind on the other ('nuisance *propria*').

In support of his interpretation of *aryá* T. refers to NPers. *irmān* 'guest', which is usually held to go back to *aryaman-*. In addition, V. I. Abayev has strengthened T.'s case with an attractive etymology of Oss. *æcægəlon* 'strange, alien', which he derives from **həθyaka-* + *arya-* 'truly alien', see *Voprosy yazykoznanija* (Akademiya Nauk SSSR), 2, 1958, 115. On the other hand, Abayev rightly points out that T.'s etymology, taken over from Andreas, of Oss. *limæn* 'friend' from *aryaman-* should be abandoned in favour of Miller's connexion of the word with the base *frī-*.

Aryaman as the hypostasis of hospitality forms a satisfactory counterpart to Mitra, the hypostasis of the treaty. Although the Avestan evidence does not confirm T.'s interpretation of Aryaman, it does not exclude it. With the slender means provided by the texts, and without taking recourse to theoretical fancies, T. has been able to make it at least likely that the conception of Aryaman is part of the same process of personification of abstractions to which the conception of Mitra belongs. By so doing T. has rendered pointless D.'s claim that Mitra and Aryaman must be fitted into what he has postulated as an Indo-European hierarchy of gods.

Since T. and, more recently, J. Brough (*BSOAS*, xxi, 2, 1958, 395 sqq.) have shown that D.'s theory is neither founded on, nor explains the Vedic facts, it is interesting to find D.-G. convinced that D. has proved and successfully tested this very theory on the Zoroastrian Aməša Spəntas. In D.'s view Varuṇa and Aša on the one hand, Mitra and Vohu Manah on the other, respectively represent the terrible and benevolent aspects of the function of 'sovereignty'; what is more, Aša and Vohu Manah are said by D. to owe their respective aspects to a conscious translation into Zoroastrian terms, of the same aspects of the discarded gods Varuṇa and Mitra. Let us see what proof is culled from the Iranian evidence, and by what method.

D. views Aša and Vohu Manah as if the Zoroastrian tradition provided no definition of the two Entities and their names offered no clue to their character. It was therefore left to him to discover their function and essence by scrutinizing the obscure meaning of cryptic Gāthic passages. He accordingly discovers that the difference between the two Entities consists in 'Aša's relative remoteness as compared with Vohu Manah's proximity to man' (D.-G., p. 50). This constitutes sufficient definition for Dumézil. Varuṇa too, he says, is more remote from man than Mitra. Hence Aša is Varuṇa in disguise,¹ and Vohu Manah is Mitra. *Quod erat demonstrandum*.

Transposed to 'mathematics' a parallel argument would run as follows: There is no means of defining the numbers represented by the symbols V and VI, except by stating that these symbols, like the symbols X and XI of the numbers ten and eleven, consist respectively of one and two signs. Ergo V represents the number ten (in disguise), and VI the number eleven.

The fact is that just as the numbers represented by V and VI are well known, and the spelling with one or two signs is easily explained as arising from the numerical definition of five and six, so the definition of Aša and Vohu Manah is clearly given by the sources, and what D. calls their respective 'remoteness' and 'proximity' is a mere secondary consequence of this definition.² The Zoroastrian tradition informs us that Aša represents the

¹ The disguise is described by D. himself as a 'sublimation' or 'transposition', *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, CLII, 1, 1957, 9 (point 3), 12, n. 2, 23, n. 2.

² The symbols V, VI = the Entities Aša and Vohu Manah; their numerical value = the definition of A. and V.M.; the spelling with one and two signs respectively = the respective remoteness and proximity of the two Entities.

element fire, while experts in Avestan studies have long known that the word means 'truth', more especially 'transcendental truth'. The definition of Vohu Manah is that it represents the 'element' cattle, while its name means 'good thought'. The behaviour of Aša and Vohu Manah in all the Gāthic passages D.-G. quotes on pp. 45-50, and in all those he does not quote (in so far as any of either group is at all understandable), is accounted for by these definitions, as are, of course, the respective 'remoteness' and 'proximity' of the two Entities. For example, it is only natural that man should 'strive towards', or 'maintain', or 'consult' Aša = Transcendental Truth = Fire, and that conversely Aša should not, like Vohu Manah, 'come' towards man; or that there should be no mention of a man's Aša, while 'a man's Vohu Manah is on a level with his deeds and words' (cf. on all this D.-G., p. 49).

Accordingly D.'s unrealistic appraisal of the data before him reveals itself both in his definition and in his inference. In the definition, in that instead of letting himself be guided by the meaningful information at his disposal, he gropes through nebulous Gāthic passages for something he calls 'remoteness' and 'proximity', and raises these two vague qualities to the status of a definition of substance; in the inference, in that even if the contention that Varuṇa is more 'remote' than Mitra were correct—which T., pp. 58 sq., has shown not to be the case—it would not warrant the conclusion that the 'remote' Aša and the 'nearer' Vohu Manah represent, respectively, Varuṇa and Mitra.

It will thus be seen that the objection to Dumézilianism does not arise from the usual, inevitable disagreement on the meaning of individual Gāthic verses.¹ The point is that D.'s conclusions are altogether irrelevant to the Iranian material, because their justification consists in bypassing reliable information, and accounting arbitrarily for what this reliable information suffices to explain. They constitute, in fact, not a doctrine which arises from the data, as its defenders claim, but one needlessly imposed on them from outside. Such new arguments as Dumézilians from time to time adduce 'in confirmation' of the

¹ With regard to the main passage in question, Y 29.3, D.-G. points out quite rightly (p. 45) that I had offered a 'rather desperate' translation as an alternative to the one used by D. However, by refraining from insisting on the latter he implicitly concedes the point I had tried to make, viz. that the verse is unusable for Dumézilian purposes because *all* translations of it are inevitably 'rather desperate'.

doctrine make no difference,¹ because what has never been proved cannot be confirmed.²

D.'s lively reaction to criticism³ cannot fail to incline would-be critics to think twice before venturing to disagree with him. But specialists have a duty towards readers who are not equipped to check the validity of statements alleged to arise from a deep insight into such difficult texts as the Gāthās. So long as D. was alone in claiming that he had proved his case the cautious reader, alive to the possibility of self-delusion, could be relied upon to exert a healthy scepticism. But the wholesale surrender of D.-G., a leading expert on Zoroastrianism, leaves the non-Indo-Iranian mythologist defenceless, as he will naturally infer from D.-G.'s approval that at least the Iranian evidence fully supports D.'s views. Fortunately it is not difficult to absolve D.-G. from ignorance of the very Gāthās he has himself translated. For D.'s error does not lie in wrong translations, or actual denial of obvious data, which D.-G. would not have failed to condemn at once. The error has in fact nothing to do with the source on which its effects are brought to bear, but is simply one of reasoning. This explains in my opinion why D.-G., finding that his sources had not been misquoted, and being no doubt predisposed towards D.'s sociological and 'functional' approach, allowed himself to overlook the elementary fallacy of the argument.

Although D.-G.'s book is seriously misleading in its uncritical attitude towards D.'s work, it is full of interesting information. Apart from surveying the progress of Western scholars in understanding the Zoroastrian scripture, D.-G. ranges with great versatility and erudition from the Dead Sea Scrolls to Shelley, discussing every reaction of non-Iranians to the

¹ To return to our 'mathematical' simile, the added argument that the composite symbols VI and XI have one sign in common, would be no confirmation of the conclusion previously reached that VI, like XI, represents the number eleven.

² The latest 'confirmation' is D.-G.'s new rendering of the Ahuna Vairya prayer (p. 104, and *Indo-Iranian Journal*, II, 1, 1958, 66 sqq.), for which he relies on H. Humbach's interpretation of *akū* as an instrumental. To me there can be no doubt that Bartholomae and Benveniste were right in interpreting the word as a nominative co-ordinated with *ratus*; this view is firmly supported by the common Avestan co-ordination of these two nouns, also in the nominative, and by the first sentence of Y 19.12, which D.-G., in his discussion of Y 19.12, has not taken into consideration.

³ On p. 24 of the article referred to above, p. 155, n. 1, scholars who feel unable to subscribe to Dumézilianism are picturesquely described as 'mongrels from every yard and of every colour, yapping at our ankles'.

teachings, or supposed teachings, of Zoroaster. His chapters on 'Iran and Greece' and 'Iran, Israel, Gnosticism' will appeal to a wide circle of readers, and can be recommended as a cautious appraisal of the many instances in which Zoroastrian articles of faith have been suspected of having influenced Greek and Jewish thought.

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JOHANNES SCHUBERT and ULRICH SCHNEIDER (ed.): *Asiatica: Festschrift Friedrich Weller zum 65. Geburtstag gewidmet von seinen Freunden, Kollegen und Schülern*. xix, 903 pp., front., 25 plates, 4 maps. Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1954. DM. 90.

This impressive volume forms a landmark in the field of Asian philological, historical, and religious research in all its ramifications. There are 55 contributions, ranging from 3 to 62 pages. They are preceded by a bibliography, up to 1954, of Professor Weller's larger publications and articles (57 entries) and reviews (111 entries). The great variety of subjects presented in this book is in keeping with the wide range of interest and immense scope of learning emerging from this bibliography. Many articles are comparative and can be classified under different headings. Extensive bibliographies are frequently added. Regrettably enough, it is not possible to give here an adequate account of the enormous richness of information contained in this volume. No doubt scholars in the different fields will critically discuss the various contributions elsewhere. Here only a few indications can be given. According to subjects the articles may be grouped as follows: I, Avesta (3); II, Veda (2); III, Sanskrit and Prakrit grammar (6); Pali (1); IV, Buddhist Sanskrit (6); V, Tibetan (3); VI, Central Asian and Mongolian (9); VII, Sinology, including Chinese Buddhism (10); VIII, Japanology, including Japanese Buddhism (5); IX, history of Buddhism (3); Indian (Buddhist) art (1); X, comparative religion and Indian philosophy (2); Indian medicine, zoology, and botany (4). This order is followed below.

I. E. Benveniste, 'Notes avestiques', discusses the words *hizvā*; *apa-x^aanva-*; *daya-*; *snāvarə.bāzura-*. W. B. Henning, 'Ein unbeachtetes Wort im Avesta', re-examines the first paragraphs of the Favardīn Yašt (13, 2-3) with regard to the word *aēm*. H. Lommel, 'Anahita—Sarasvati', arrives at the conclusion that the Iranian goddess 'Arədvī Sūrā Anāhitā' (originally 'Harahvati') essentially corresponds to the Vedic goddess 'Sarasvati'.

II. R. Hauschild, 'Das Selbstlob (*Ātma-*

stuti) des Somaberauchten Gottes Agni', continuing Joh. Hertels' investigations, devotes 42 pp. to a new interpretation of Rgveda x.119. In § 13 of his article, 'Les vers insérés dans la prose védique', L. Renou observes: 'Mais ce qui persiste d'un bout à l'autre de manière souvent dominante, c'est le verset de "brahmodya", qui représente en somme un aspect popularisé de l'hymnologie à énigmes du RV. et de l'AV.'

III. T. Burrow, 'The Sanskrit precativē', investigates relevant grammatical formations in Hittite, Tocharian, Latin, Phrygian, and Old Persian. In his opinion the precativē is not a creation of Sanskrit, analogical or otherwise, but rather an interesting and important archaism which has been preserved. Paul Thieme, 'Die Wurzel *vat*': one of the conclusions of this (Indo-European) study regarding the root (*api*)*vat* is expressed as follows: 'In Wahrheit ist der Weg von "blasen" zu "inspirieren" und zu "Dichter" ebenso gerade wie kurz. . . . Nicht nur im Lateinischen, Keltischen und Germanischen findet sich die Vorstellung der "Inspiration" ausgedrückt mit dem alten idg. Verb **vat* "blasen", sondern auch im RV und im Avesta . . .'. Hartmut Scharfe, 'Kleine Nachlese zu Kielhorns Übersetzung von Nāgōjibhaṭṭas Paribhāṣendūsekharā': Kielhorn's translation of this work is a most admirable achievement. However, a few general expressions have been all too vaguely interpreted. The author suggests corrections of the following words: *arthāpatti*, *asāngati*, etc., *buddhi*, *vyabhicāra*, *spāṣtam*. L. Alsdorf, 'Der Vedha in der Vasudevahiṇḍi': the use of the Vedha—this peculiar intermediate between normal verse and rhythmic prose—furnishes linguistic evidence for the high antiquity of this Jaina text. Professor Alsdorf has found 260 Vedhas in the Vh. alone, a large number of which are reproduced and discussed. Among the several important conclusions of this article: they show a strong affinity to the material collected by H. Jacobi. They are probably not far removed from the ones found in the classical canon. Gustav Roth, 'Mohanagrha in Prakrittexten, in Kautilya's Arthaśāstra und in den Annalen des Tabārī': the Vedha is also discussed in this article which clarifies the meaning of *mohanagrha* and other (architectural) terms. Franklin Edgerton, 'The Middle Indic verb system', once more draws attention to the 'historic fallacy', i.e. the danger of distorting the descriptive pattern of a language under the influence of what is known of its history. Among other things, he lists all the *i*-aorists mentioned by W. Geiger in his Pali grammar (§ 169) as from the 'athematic conjugation' and supplies for each the thematic